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APPLICABLE LAW IN 
INTERNATIONAL TERRORIST 
THREATS AND ATTACKS AND THE 
CONSEQUENCES OF ERROR IN 
PERSONAM 
SOMCHARTISUCHAJUTKUL 1 
Three years have passed since the fall of the twin towers and yet public 
international law remains too murky and inadequate to offer a compre-
hensive prohibition regime or a universally acceptable defmition of ter-
rorism. Many authors have already examined the necessity of such a 
definition2 and some have criticized the usefulness of the defmition it-
self. 3 As we search for this definition, the world financial order, the in-
1. S.J.D. Candidate, DEA (Paris II), LL.M. (London), LL.Lic. (Alcala de Henares, Madrid), 
Abogado, Member of the Bar Association of Madrid 
2. See, e.g., R. Calduch Cervera, La incidencia de los atentados del 11 de septiembre en el 
terrorismo internacional, 53 REVISTA ESPANOLA DE DERECHO INTERNACIONAL 173 (2001); 1. A. 
Frowein, Der Terrorismus als Herausfoderung for der Volkersrecht, ZEITSCHRIFr FOR 
AUSLANDISCHES OFFENTLICHES RECHT UNO VOLKERRECHT 879 (2002); G. Guillaume, Terrorisme 
et Ie droit international, 215 COLLECTED COURSES FROM THE HAGUE ACADEMY OF lNTERNA TIONAL 
LAW 293 (1989); E. Hugues, La notion de terrorisme en droit international: en quete d'une 
definitionjuridique, JOURNAL DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 753 (2002); Y. Jurovics, Les controverses 
sur la question de la qualification du terrorisme: crime de droit commun, crime de guerre ou crime 
contre I'humanite, in LE DROIT INTERNATIONAL FACE AU TERRORISME 95 (K. Bannelier, et al. eds., 
2003) (Fr.); S. Te1hami, Conflicting Views of Terrorism, 35 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 581 (2002), S. 
Tiefenbrun, A Semiotic Approach to a Legal Definition on Terrorism, 9 ILSA J. INT'L & COMPo L. 
357 (2003). These authors consider that the search for a universally acceptable defmition of terror-
ism is necessary. 
3. See, e.g., R. Higgins, The General International Law of Terrorism, in TERRORISM AND 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 13 (R. Higgins & M. Flory eds., 1997) (Eng.); P. Mertens, L 'introuvable acte 
de terrorisme, in REFLEXIONS SUR LA DEFINITION ET LA REPRESSION DU TERRORISME 39 (Centre de 
droit international et Association beige des juristes democrates eds. 1974) (Belg.); E. Konstantinov, 
International Terrorism and International Law, GERMAN YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 293 
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ternational flow of capital, and even the most basic human rights are 
being adversely affected as a result of post-September 11 anti-terrorism 
policies. 4 These obstacles are deplorable since even United Nations Se-
curity Council Resolution. 1373, one of the essential instruments de-
signed to combat terrorism, fails to define terrorism. Consequently, 
criticisms over the abuse of power or the inefficient implementation of 
Security Council imposed counterterrorist measures are not uncommon. 5 
The objective of this paper is neither to reiterate the diversity of defini-
tions nor to corroborate a particular position on the concept of interna-
tional terrorism but to facilitate the search for the definition of interna-
tional terrorism, which seems to be of immediate and urgent priority in 
the context of 21 st century globalization. In my attempt to identify the 
contemporary core terrorist threat, I will first focus on a model of distinc-
tion based on the applicable law in Part I. I will discuss why this model 
is appropriate and compatible with the trends of international law dealing 
with international terrorism. In Part II, I will give a brief exposition of 
the risks associated with the proposed model, namely the risk of error in 
personam, an unavoidable risk inherent to the model proposed, espe-
cially when a State, exercising its right to self-defense, is under extreme 
pressure or under circumstances of exception. 
I. APPLICABLE LAW IN INTERNATIONAL TERRORIST 
THREATS 
Does the international community have sufficient resources to take effi-
cient measures against all forms of terrorist threats? If so, there is no 
need to prioritize any particular form of terrorism. However, prioritiza-
tion may benefit lesser developed countries that may encounter difficul-
ties in enforcing stricter police measures. After all, international security 
depends on the effort of every member of the international community in 
implementing preventive and repressive measures against terrorism. In 
my attempt to concretize the more serious terrorist threats from the less 
serious cases, I will first identify terrorist activities that are already 
treated under the laws of war (1), then I will focus on the characteristics 
of terrorist activities that should not be regulated by the laws of war (2). 
(1988). These authors do not believe that it is essential to reach a consensus on the defmition of 
terrorism. 
4. For a general overview on how the global fmancial market is affected by contemporary 
counterterrorist policies, see, e.g., L. Condorelli, Les attentats du 11 septembre et leurs suites: ou va 
Ie droit international, 105 REVUE GENERALE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 829 (2001). 
5. See, e.g., Hugues, supra note 2, at 768. The author comes to the conclusion that the effi-
ciency of United Nation Security Council (U.N. SCOR) Resolution 1373 depends greatly on the 
precision of the definition of terrorism. 
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A. ABSORBING THE 'SELF-DETERMINATION EXCEPTION' BY THE 
LAWS OF WAR 
After the Second World War, the international community radically pri-
oritized the problem of international terrorism. This prioritization oc-
curred on the global level, as reflected in the agenda of the United Nation 
General Assembly (UNGA) and the United Nations Security Counsel 
(UNSC),6 as well as on the regional level - especially among integration-
ist organizations such as the European Union (EU), the Organization of 
the Islamic Conference (OIC) and the Association of South-East Asian 
Nations (ASEAN). Consequently, the search for the most appropriate 
solution among States for the fight against terrorism loses its direction 
when it stumbles upon the 'self-determination exception' vigorously 
sustained by a number of States. 7 According to its original conception, 
the oppressed peoples under colonial rule, apartheid regime, or foreign 
domination should not be deprived of their right to struggle against the 
oppressive regime through violent means. 
Although the 'self-determination exception' inspired the international 
community's confidence in confirming an absolute prohibition on inter-
national terrorism, its original content had become somewhat obsolete in 
the 21 51 century since the problems of foreign domination, as conceived 
in the colonial period, had practically disappeared. Nevertheless, State 
practice suggests that the 'self-determination exception' has progres-
sively transformed into the controversial right of the minorities to strug-
gle against an oppressive regime. 8 Accordingly, this transformation had 
complicated the progress of international cooperation between States on 
the 'war against terrorism' because the extent of a minority's right to 
struggle against an undemocratic regime remains unclear in contempo-
rary international law. Certainly the study of the rights of minorities can 
not be completely covered within the scope of this paper but a distant 
consideration of the 'self-determination exception' is sufficient to con-
ceptualize its possible regulation under jus in bello. This can be done by 
6. See, e.g., V.N. Doc. NRES/3034 (XXVII). 
7. Claims for the self-detennination exception coming from States such as Cuba, Libya, 
Kuwait and Syria can be found in V.N.Doc. AIP.V.2038-2063 & 2114. Other States such as Saudi 
Arabia and Yemen subject their implementation ofV.N. SCOR. Res. 1373 to the self-determination 
exception or the definition of terrorism as understood in the Arab Convention for the Suppression of 
Terrorism (available at <http://www.al-bab.com!arab/docs!league/terrorism98.htm>. See, e.g., U.N. 
Doc. S/2003/583 at 15 and S/2002/240 at 3. 
8. See, e.g., J. Verhoeven, DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 291-295, (Larcier eds. 2000) 
(Belg.). However, Professor Verhoeven notes that it is more likely that the rights of the "peuples 
non coloniaux" would develop parallel to the rights of individuals rather than parallel to the rights of 
a nation. Id. at 294. 
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distinguishing between peacetime and wartime terrorism, but is this dis-
tinction appropriate? 
The dispute over the submission of certain forms of terrorism to jus in 
bello finds its roots in two opposing schools: on the one hand, the conti-
nental European school9 advocates the distinction between peacetime 
and wartime terrorism; on the other hand, the Anglo-Saxon countries 10 
reject this distinction as they view terrorism as 'low intensity warfare' 
and opt for the absolute necessity to eliminate all forms of terrorism at 
whatever cost. 
As a result of this doctrinal discussion, the United Kingdom and the 
United States take the responsibility to wage an abstract and general 'war 
on terrorism,' sometimes in the name of self-defense, at other times in 
the name of the international community. The two allies seek to elimi-
nate all forms of terrorism, be it international or internal. Despite the 
goodwill of these propositions, they do not appear to be proportionate to 
the time and budget-restrained resources of the international community 
which could be more efficiently allocated otherwise. 
On the contrary, the European school aims at the prioritization of certain 
kinds of terrorism which should single-out and eventually become ob-
jects of a comprehensive conventional regulation. In this sense, it would 
be best to distinguish between wartime and peacetime terrorism. Al-
though the two types of terrorism share common characteristics, such as 
the use of force against civilian objectives, they are substantially differ-
ent. Under contemporary international humanitarian law, wartime terror-
ism is already covered and typified as "war crimes;" this qualification 
covers international armed conflicts (where there are at least two States 
involved) as well as internal armed conflicts or civil struggles (where 
there is only one State present). According to this regime, non-
humanitarian intervention in an internal armed conflict without the terri-
torial State's consent would amount to a violation of the general prohibi-
tion on the use of force. In the case of terrorism in the context of an in-
ternational armed conflict - where terrorist activities committed against 
the 'Victim State' are unquestionably attributable to the 'Aggressor 
9. For a view on the European school's distinction theory between peacetime and wartime 
terrorism, see, e.g., Calduch Cervera, supra note 2, at 191; and G. WARDLAW, POLITICAL 
TERRORISM, 74-77 (Cambridge, 1984). 
10. For a comparison between the U.S.IV.K.llsraeli 'low intensity warfare' theory and the 
European school's distinction between peacetime and wartime terrorism, see Calduch Cervera, supra 
note 2, at 190. For a more detailed explanation on the U.S.'s tendency to qualifY terrorism as an 
armed conflict, see also P. Wilkinson, The Role o/the Military in Combating Te"orism in a Democ-
ratic Society, 8(3) TERRORISM AND POLITICAL VIOLENCE 1 (1996); U.S. Department of Defense, 
1997 ANNUAL DEFENSE REpORT (1998). 
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State' - armed intervention would be permissible in favor of the Victim 
State in the form of collective self defense. Up to this point the solution 
is clear and evident in the light of contemporary international law. 
The problem arises when the attacks can not be unequivocally attributed 
to any particular state. In such a case, the application of the laws of war 
would depend solely on the quality of the author of the aggression. Al-
though this inconvenience remains inherent to the wartime / peacetime 
terrorism distinction theory, the methods for overcoming this inconven-
ience will be discussed in part II of this paper. For the purpose of this 
note, it is sufficient to say that wartime terrorism (including international 
armed conflicts as well as non-international armed conflicts) should be 
explicitly excluded from the 21 st century's 'global fight against terror-
ism' because the type of terrorism actually under scrutiny is peacetime 
terrorism which is seriously disturbing the unavoidable globalization 
process. 11 
B. IDENTIFYING PEACETIME TERRORISM 
Peacetime terrorism is an internationally organized crime which clearly 
distinguishes itself from other common crimes which are contained in a 
single legal criminal system. In this sense, peacetime terrorism should 
exclude sporadic and individual attacks since they are not organized and 
thus, do not require complex preventive or rej;lressive measures. On the 
contrary, incidents such as the September 11 attack or the more recent 
Atocha train station bombing (March 11, 2004)12 are made possible due 
to complex and skillful planning. The measures adopted in U.N. SCOR 
Res. 1373 are most efficient to combat this type of organized crime. 
The second characteristic of peacetime terrorism lies in its objective. In 
a study of different generations of terrorism,I3 we find that the type of 
terrorism that imposes the greatest threat today is not one which attacks a 
single state but one which attacks certain principles which are common 
to a community of states. This class of objective propagates an espe-
cially serious threat to international peace and security because it is not 
II. The implementation of the U.N. SCOR Res. 1373 requires reinforcement of preventive 
measures which leads to disturbances in the international financial and investment sectors. These 
measures have been vigorously criticized by various authors. See, e.g., S.D. Murphy, International 
Law, the United States, and the Non-Military "War" Against Terrorism, 14 EUR. 1. INT'L L. 347 
(2003); F. Megret, War? Legal Semantics and the Move to Violence, 13 EUR. 1. INT'L L. 361 (2002). 
12. A summary of the Atocha attack can be found at 
<http://en.wikipedia.orglwikiIMarch_11 ,_2004_ Madrid_attacks>. 
13. The third generation of international terrorism is also known as terrorism without bounda-
ries. See, Th. Bruha, Gewaltverbot und humanitiiries Volkerrecht nach dem 1l.September 2001, 
ARCHIV DES VOLKERRECHTS 383 (2002). 
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confined to any single territory or state but it targets the entire interna-
tional community itself. It is therefore convincing to refer to the authors 
of these crimes as hostes humani generis. 14 
The third characteristic of peacetime terrorism is the presence of an in-
ternational element, resulting in the involvement of more than one legal 
system. Parallel to familiar concepts of private international law, a ter-
rorist incident which has no international element is nothing more than a 
common crime and the duty to prevent and repress the crime would fall 
on the state in which the attack occurred - the Victim State. However, 
when the terrorist organization enjoys a sophisticated transnational struc-
ture through foreign funds, donations, or various 'cells' established 
throughout the world, or when the terrorist organization targets its attack 
against foreign soil or against foreign victims, it has bypassed the 'mu-
nicipal' threshold and it qualifies as international peacetime terrorism. 
Through the application of the above proposition, the international com-
munity can focus its efforts appropriately on a specific type of terrorism 
- international peacetime terrorism - which deserves to be prioritized for 
its greatest scale of threat against international peace and security. The 
application of preventive and repressive measures imposed by U.N 
SCOR Res. 1373 and, to a certain extent, by general international law 
could be unequivocally aimed at and limited to these situations. From a 
legal-economic point of view, the resources of countries with more lim-
ited military expenditures could be more efficiently employed in the 
peacetime 'war on terrorism' - in its highly political sense. 
This prioritization of problems does· not resolve the lack of transparency 
when it comes to attribution of terrorist attacks to states. However, the 
problem of attribution may be illusory when viewed from the perspective 
of legitimate defense and state responsibility for internationally wrongful 
acts, especially when there is a circumstance precluding wrongfulness. 
II. LEGITIMATE DEFENSE AND CONSEQUENCES OF ERROR 
IN PERSONAM 
According to the outline exposed above, wartime terrorism is clearly 
distinguished from peacetime terrorism. As a result, the Victim State of 
a peacetime terrorist attack may not have recourse to military interven-
tion under the color of legitimate defense against the perpetrators of 
peacetime terrorism who reside in another state. Because these perpetra-
14. There is a trend to include terrorism among crimes against humanity. See, e.g., V.D. 
Sharma, International Crimes and Universal Jurisdiction, 42 INDIAN J. INT.L L. 139 (2002). 
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tors are not states but private individuals, the conflict would not fall un-
der conventional or interstate warfare. 
This is easier said than done because in reality legitimate defense is a 
legal concept which comes into operation in exceptional circumstances. 
When extreme circumstances impose an immediate threat, the Victim 
State's government is often subjected to political and popular scrutiny 
which may impair or adversely affect its capacity to assess the facts. 
Even still, the subjectively clear and present danger provides apparently 
legitimate grounds for a Victim State to make hasty decisions, even if the 
decisions were based on conclusions drawn from incomplete facts. 
Despite the doctrinal arguments on the interpretation of Article 51 of the 
United Nations Charter, there are a number of authors who are convinced 
that the right to self defense is a natural, fundamental, and inalienable 
right of a state which can not be superseded by the institutional frame-
work of the Charter itself. 15 One of the most outstanding consequences 
of this interpretation is that the Victim State itself retains the exclusive 
right to appreciate and consider the facts and to decide if it is appropriate 
or not to proceed to legitimate defense. Accordingly, the Victim State 
could engage in a conventional war against an alleged 'Perpetrator State' 
when the right to self defense is wrongfully founded as a result of an 
error in personam. 
Indeed, the applicable law for the repression of the terrorist attacks de-
pends strongly on the nature of the subject who had organized these at-
tacks - in this case we refer to the subjects who are immediate authors or 
co-authors of the attack, excluding accomplices. If it turns out that the 
acts are directly attributable to the accused Perpetrator State in confor-
mity with the control test,16 as it is mentioned in article 8 of the draft 
articles on state responsibility, adopted by U.N. GAOR Res. 56/83 or as 
underlined in the Nicaragua Case l ? or the Tadic Case,18 the laws of war 
15. See, e.g., M.E. O'Connell, Lawful Self-Defense to Terrorism, 63 UNIVERSITY OF 
PITISBURG LAW REVIEW 889 (2002); T. M. Franck, Editorial Comments: Terrorism and the Right 
to Self-Defense, 95 AM. J. INT'L .L. 839 (2001). 
16. For a more detailed and profound synthesis of attribution and the control test, see C. Stahn, 
International Law at Crossroads? The Impact of September I I, ZEITSCHRIFT FOR AUSLANDISCHES 
OFFENTLICHES RECHT UND VOLKERRECHT 183 (2002); see also J. Verhoeven, Les 'etirements' de la 
legitime defense, ANNUAIRE FRAN!;A1SE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 49 (2002). 
17. Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14 (June 27). Since there 
was no clear evidence that the U.S. actually exercised effective control over the Contras, the U.S.'s 
assistance to the paramilitaries was not sufficient for the purpose of attributing the militia's actions 
to the U.S. Id. at 146. 
18. Prosecutor v. Tadic, 38 I.L.M. 1518 (1999). The International Criminal Tribunal for the 
Former Yugoslavia held that it was not necessary to satisfy the specific control test and that the 
overall control test was sufficient to attribute the acts of the militias to a State. 
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would be applicable and the emerging problem of 'wartime terrorism' 
would be covered by the overwhelming violation of the prohibition on 
the use of force by the Perpetrator State. Consequently, the Victim State 
would then be entitled to self defense under jus ad bellum. 
However, if the attribution test fails, the laws of war do not apply and the 
'Victim State'19 - although a 'victim' of a terrorist attack of a great scale 
- would have to resort to repressive and preventive measures that are 
compatible with the rules of public international law that normally gov-
ern the intercourse of states in times of peace. Under contemporary in-
ternational law the Victim State would only be able to resort to peace-
time counterterrorist measures such as the ones covered in Res. 1373. 
Nevertheless, the attitude of the alleged Perpetrator State is contributory 
to the error in personam of the Victim State. Contemporary state prac-
tice shows that states have a tendency to deny their links to terrorist ac-
tivities when being exposed to international scrutiny. This rejection can 
be verbal, by denouncing or openly condemning the attacks,2° or it can 
be substantial, through the adoption and/or the enforcement of repressive 
measures against the terrorist activities,21 namely through the prosecution 
of alleged perpetrators or their extradition to the Victim State. Evidently, 
the sole fact that the accused state does not promptly deny its links with 
terrorist activities does not imply that it is actually supporting, harboring, 
financing, or engaging in these activities. However, the prolongation of 
19. The expression is used in quotation marks to underline the subjectivity of the quality of the 
Victim State since it is the self-proclaimed Victim State itself that attempts to gather evidence to 
attribute the terrorist attacks to a Perpetrator State. 
20. See, e.g., Military and Paramilitary Activities, supra note 17 at 67, 130; Id. at 156 (separate 
opinion of Judge Singh). The U.S.'s "legal tradition of respect for the judicial process and human 
rights" was reflected in its attempt to recall copies of the CIA manuals. In this manner, the U.S.'s 
demand for the Contras to ignore the manual could be seen as an attempt to interrupt the mechanism 
of attribution under international law. As a result, the Court held that the CIA manual does not 
provide a basis for concluding that the acts of the paramilitaries are imputable to the U.S. Id. atl48; 
see also, United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran, 1980 I.C.J. 3. In this case, the 
statements made by various governmental authorities in Iran amounted to an endorsement by the 
State of the acts of private people. Id. at 33, 34; see also, Libya's verbal notes to the U.N. 
<http://web.ukonline.co.ukJpbrooke/p&t/Lockerbie/letter>, in which Libya expresses its good will to 
implement U.N. SCOR Res. 1373. 
21. Following the 9/11 attacks, many States have already adopted and/or reinforced measures 
designed to prevent and repress terrorism and its monetary support. State practice in the implemen-
tation of prevention and repression duties can be found at the U.N. Counter Terrorist Committee 
website <http://www.un.orgIDocslsc/committeeslI373>.Seealso.e.g.Megret.supranotell.at 
382; S. von Schorlemer, Human Rights: Substantive and Institutional Implications of the War 
Against Terrorism, 14 EUR. J. INT'L L. 279 (2003); J.M. Sorel, Some Questions About the Definition 
of Terrorism and the Fight Against Its Financing, 14 EUR. J. INT'L L. 373 (2003). 
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the lack of transparency22 is likely to lead the Victim State to the error in 
personam,23 given the urgency of the situation. 
According to the rules of international responsibility, the use of force 
under the color of legitimate defense would not be an internationally 
wrongful act. 24 It is also arguable that even if the conditions of propor-
tionality, necessity, and attribution are not met, the Victim State's armed 
intervention would still not be considered to be internationally wrongful 
if its assessment of the conditions of self defense were incorrect due to 
an error in personam. In this case, the Victim State could benefit from 
the force majeure exception according to draft Article 23 of the Interna-
tional Law Commission's Articles on State Responsibility25 because the 
error could have been due to the 'irresistible' lack of transparency, mak-
ing it impossible to verify the correctness of the intelligence reports on 
the relation between the terrorist group and the State that seems to harbor 
them. The admission of error in personam as a circumstance precluding 
wrongfulness finds its roots in the cas fortuit exception which was re-
moved in the final draft articles. Authors, who are in favor of maintain-
ing this exception, define cas fortuit as "an unforeseeable exterior ele-
ment beyond the control of the State, as a result of which it is materially 
impossible to know that the adopted conduct is contrary to the obliga-
tion."26 Despite the uncertainty of its applicability, this exception may 
recover its force as a lex specialis. 27 
22. Before the anned intervention in Afghanistan took place, the Taliban government said that 
it would consider extraditing terror suspect Osarna Bin Laden based on U.S. evidence. At the same 
time, Mr. Bin Laden has denied involvement in the attacks on the U.s. BBC News, (Sept. 12,2001) 
<http://news.bbc.co. uk/llhi/world/south _ asialI539468.stm>. 
23. The incorrect assessment of the facts could lead to error in personam. After careful reas-
sessment of the facts, the 9-11 Commission's Staff Statement No. 16 <http://www.9-
II commission.govlhearings/hearing 12/staff _ statement_16.pdf> suggests that the degree of the 
Taliban government's involvement with the 9/11 attacks may be less than what it was believed to be 
prior to the commencement of Operation Enduring Freedom. 
24. See draft article 21 of U.N. GAOR Res. 56/83. 
25. See U.N. Doc. AlRES/56/83; ILC Report, 56th Sess., Supp. No. 10 at 183-188, U.N. Doc. 
Al56/10. 
26. See A. Gattini, La notion de faute a la lumiere du projet de convention de la Commission 
du Droit International sur la responsabilite internationale, 3 EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 270 (1999). In this article, the author defmes cas fortuit as "I'evenement 
exterieur irnprevisible en dehors du contr61e de l'Etat, en raison desquels il est materiellement 
impossible de ... se rendre compte que la conduite adoptee n'est pas conforrne a I'obligation"; see 
also (1979-11) Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 123 at §4. 
27. The casfortuit exception was not only defended by Roberto Ago, special rapporteur of the 
International Law Commission (ILC), but it is also contemplated in Article 91 of Additional Proto-
col I (June, 8 1977) to the Geneva Convention (August, 12 1949) for the protection of victims of 
anned conflict 
<http://www.icrc.org/dih.nsf/0/ee8bb71 eb I db5bb4c I 2563bd002dd II d?OpenDocument>. 
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The preventive and repressive measures imposed by Res. 1373 contribute 
to the avoidance of these kinds of errors in the assessment and attribution 
of terrorist attacks to states. Such errors do not only disturb peaceful 
intercourse among states but they also create a threat to international 
peace and security. In the future, when States are faced with the di-
lemma on how to qualify the masterminds of a certain terrorist attack, 
they could interrogate the alleged Perpetrator State's compliance with the 
measures provided by Res. 1373. The accused State would then be 
obliged to report the measures it had taken to the Counter-Terrorism 
Committee and this Committee would independently approve or disap-
prove the accused State's efforts in repressing and preventing interna-
tional peacetime terrorism. 28 
The regime established by this resolution promotes transparency of threat 
management among States and reduces the chance of error in personam 
when dealing with grey-zone cases. 
III. CONCLUSION 
Terrorism is an abstract and general concept which calls for various ap-
plicable laws. While jus in bello is applicable to a State which carries 
out terrorist attacks against individuals during civil war or during an in-
ternal armed conflict, it is inapplicable to 'State sponsored terror' used to 
repress individuals, such as the terror policies in a totalitarian State 
where there is an absence of armed conflict. This does not preclude, of 
course, an application of the principles of minimum standards in the 
treatment of foreign nationals. On the other end, when a State carries out 
a terrorist attack against another State, the two subjects of international 
law could be engaged in conventional warfare and there is no doubt that 
jus in bello and jus ad bellum - including the right of self defense of the 
Victim State - would be applicable. However, when terrorist activities 
are carried out by individuals, it is almost always a case of peacetime 
terrorism (except when the individuals are engaged in an internal armed 
conflict against the State, as previously mentioned). Falling short of an 
armed conflict, crimes committed by individuals against other individu-
als - as horrible and as terrible as they may be - remain common crimes. 
In order to safeguard the efficiency of U.N. Security Council Res. 1373, 
the international community needs to agree on a precise definition of its 
common enemy. To facilitate this process it would be productive to pri-
28. The U.N. Counter-Terrorism Committee was established by U.N. SCOR Res. 1373 to 
monitor the implementation of this resolution by all States and to increase the States' capability to 
fight terrorism. 
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oritize and single out international peacetime terrorism. Peacetime ter-
rorism - the type of terrorism on which we should focus in the context of 
21 st century globalization - is limited to terrorist attacks committed by 
individuals against a State or against the international community (or 
otherwise designated as 3rd generation terrorism29). It is towards these 
types of terrorism that U.N. Security Council Res. 1373 is crafted to pre-
vent and repress. 
29. See Bruha, supra note 13. 
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